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School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: 
A Model Legislative Response 
Arthur E. Wise 
On August 31, 1971, the California Supreme 
Court, in Serrano v. Priest tentatively concluded that 
California's public school financing system denies 
children the equal protection of the laws because it 
produces substantial disparities among school districts 
in the amount of revenue available for education. In 
the words of the Court: 
We are called upon to determine whether the California 
public school financing system, with its substantial dependence 
on local property taxes and resultant wide disparities in 
school revenue, violates the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. We have determined that this 
funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor 
because it makes the quality of a child's education a function 
of the wealth of his parents and neighbors. Recognizing as 
we must that the right to an education in our public schools 
is a fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned on 
wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose neces-
sitating the present method of financing. We have concluded, 
therefore, that such a system cannot withstand constitutional 
challenge and must fall before the equal protection clause.1 
The problems to which the case was addressed can 
be simply put. One school district in California ex-
pended only $577.49 to educate each of its pupils in 
1968-69 while another expended $1,231. 72 per pupil. 
The principal source of this inequity was the dif-
ference in local assessed property valuation per child: 
in the first school district the figure was $3, 706 per 
child while in the second it was $50,885-a ratio of 
one to thirteen. Moreover, in the first, citizens paid a 
school tax of $5.48 per $100 of assessed valuation 
while in the second residents paid only $2.38 per 
hundred-a ratio of over two to one. 
* * * 
The tentative decision in Serrano did not actually 
strike down the school finance system. The case was 
remanded to the trial court, which, if it determines that 
the facts are as alleged, apparently must find the 
system unconstitutional. The Court did not indicate 
what would constitute a constitutional school finance 
plan. However, a reading of the Court's opinion 
may begin to reveal what would be permissible. 
Serrano: The Wealth-Free Interpretation 
The California Court noted that "the United States 
Supreme Court has demonstrated a marked antipathy 
toward legislative classifications which discriminate 
on the basis of certain 'suspect' personal charac-
teristics. One factor which has repeatedly come under 
close scrutiny of the high court is wealth." Concerning 
the implicit classification by district wealth, the 
Court said: 
To allot more educational dollars to the children of one dis-
trict than to those of another merely because of the fortuitous 
presence of such property is to make the quality of a child's 
education dependent upon the location of private commercial 
and industrial establishments. Surely, this is to rely on the 
most irrelevant of factors as the basis for educational 
financing. 
The Court thus found that the school financing system 
discriminates on the basis of the wealth of a district 
and its residents. 
While the Court had substantial judicial prece-
dent for finding wealth a suspect classification, 
it did not have judicial precedent for finding 
education a "fundamental interest." Such a 
finding was important for the theory which the Court 
was attempting to develop. Previously, the funda-
mental interest concept had been applied to the rights 
of defendants in criminal cases and voting rights. 
The Court relied upon a number of decisions which 
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"while not legally controlling" are "persuasive in the 
factual description of the significance of learning." 
The classic expression of this position came in Brown 
v. Board of Education: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance 
laws and the great expenditures for education both demon-
strate our recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our 
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed 
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it 
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In 
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of 
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms. 
These cases, together with the Court's own analysis of 
the importance of education, compelled it to treat 
education as a "fundamental interest." 
The final step in the application of the "strict 
scrutiny" equal protection standard was a determi-
nation of whether the California school financing 
scheme as presently structured was necessary to 
achieve a "compelling state interest." Concluding that 
it was not, the Court declared: 
The California public school financing system, as presented 
to us by plaintiffs' complaint supplemented by matters 
judicially noticed, since it deals intimately with education, 
obviously touches upon a fundamental interest. For the 
reasons we have explained in detail, this system conditions 
the full entitlement to such interest on wealth, classifies its 
recipients on the basis of their collective affluence and makes 
the quality of a child's education depend upon the resources 
of his school district and ultimately upon the pocket-book of 
his parents. We find that such financing system as presently 
constituted is not necessary to the attainment of any com-
pelling state interest. Since it does not withstand the requisite 
"strict scrutiny," it denies to the plain~iffs and others similarly 
situated the equal protection of the laws. 
One interpretation of the Serrano opinion is con-
sistent with the proposition developed by Coons, 
Clune and Sugarman-"the quality of public edu-
cation may not be a function of wealth other than the 
wealth of the state as a whole. "2 This proposition 
would only permit educational quality to vary from 
school district to school district so long as each 
district had an equal capacity to raise funds for ed-
ucation. Thus, for example, the state would guarantee 
that a community that chose to tax itself for education 
at the rate of 1 per cent would have $400 per student 
available to spend on education, irrespective of the 
wealth of that community. A community that chose 
to tax itself at the rate of 2 per cent would have 
available $ 800 per student, again irrespective of the 
wealth of that community. The state in this scheme 
commits itself to a specified level of expenditure 
per student in accordance with a district's willingness 
to tax itself for education, regardless of what is 
raised by the local tax. The state gives aid to localities 
in exactly the amount that local resources are in-
sufficient to reach the expenditure level specified for 
any given degree of local district taxing effort. This 
scheme is known as "district power equalizing." 
This wealth-free interpretation of Serrano would 
remove variations in local wealth as a factor in 
determining how much is to be spent on the education 
of a child. The capacity of each school district to 
raise funds would be equalized. However, local school 
districts would be permitted to decide how heavily 
they are willing to tax themselves and, consequently, 
how much they wish to spend on the education of 
their children. The wealth-free interpretation focuses 
rather more on taxpayer equity and rather less on 
educational equity. 3 
Serrano: The Equal Educational Opportunity 
Interpretation 
A second interpretation of the Serrano opinion is 
consistent with the proposition developed by the 
author-the quality of a child's education may not be 
a function of where a student lives, what his parental 
circumstances are, or how highly his neighbors value 
education. 4 This proposition would prohibit variations 
in the number of dollars spent on any child by virtue 
of his place of residence, other than variations based 
on such factors as differences in price levels and 
economies of scale. It would also permit variations 
based on educationally relevant characteristics of the 
child. 
In the course of the opinion, the Court disposed 
of an argument "that territorial uniformity in respect 
to the present financing system is not constitutionally 
required." "Where fundamental rights or suspect 
classifications are at stake," said the Court, "a state's 
general freedom to discriminate on a geographical 
basis will be significantly curtailed by the equal pro-
tection clause." In support of this interpretation, the 
Court first relied upon the school closing cases in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated efforts to shut 
schools in one part of a state while schools in other 
areas continued to operate. Secondly, the Court relied 
upon the reapportionment cases in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that accidents of geography and 
arbitrary boundary lines of local government can 
afford no ground for discrimination among a state's 
citizens. "If a voter's address may not determine the 
weight to which his ballot is entitled, surely it should 
not determine the quality of his child's education." 
Consequently, it would appear that school finance 
plans cannot have different effects solely because of 
irrelevant geographic factors. In other words, neither 
wealth nor irrelevant geography is a permissible basis 
for classifying children for the purpose of determining 
how much is to be spent on their education. 
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One point which remains unclear in the opinion is 
whether the equal protection clause has been held to 
apply to children, to taxpayers or to school districts. If 
it is children who are entitled to equal protection, 
then it is difficult to understand how the quality of a 
child's education could be subjected to a vote of his 
neighbors. 
The equal educational opportunity interpretation 
of Serrano would require that educational resource 
allocation not depend upon where a student lives, 
what his parental circumstances are, or how highly 
his neighbors value education. 
The equal educational opportunity interpretation 
would permit a legislature to adopt one of a variety 
of educational resource allocation standards. For 
example, the minimum attainment standard would 
require that educational resources be allocated to 
every student until he reaches a specified level of at-
tainment. The leveling standard would require that 
resources be allocated in inverse proportion to 
students' ability; the competition standard would re-
quire their allocation in direct proportion to such 
ability. The equal dollars per pupil standard would 
assume that ability is an illegitimate basis for dif-
ferentiating among students. The classification 
standard would require that what is regarded as a 
"suitable" level of support for a student of specified 
characteristics is suitable for that student wherever he 
lives within the state. 5 
Differences in spending per child would have to be 
justified primarily by reference to educationally-
relevant characteristics of the child. Geographical 
factors should be irrelevant except as they give rise to 
other inequities which affect the cost of education. 
Thus, in some sparsely-populated areas it is necessary 
to operate small schools which are more costly on a 
per-pupil basis. In other areas, particularly urban 
areas, there tend to be higher price-levels which affect 
the cost of purchasing goods and services for the 
schools. In other words, the cost of education of a 
given quality (however defined) varies as a result of 
economies of scale and regional price-level differences. 
A plan to achieve equality of educational opportunity 
must recognize these factors. 
Full State Funding 
The years since a constitutional attack on current 
school finance legislation was proposed have seen an 
unprecedented level of activity directed at legislative 
reform. The concept of full state funding has entered 
the vocabulary of educational finance. 
In a paper prepared at the request of the Education 
Commission of the States we stated: 
That the state should assume a large proportion of the cost 
of public education seems to many to be ·an idea whose time 
has arrived. It is attractive for a number of reasons: 
(1) There is a renewed concern for the inequalities which 
characterize the manner in which education is provided .... 
(2) Local support of education relies heavily on the property 
tax. This is the most poorly administered of all major forms 
of taxation. Furthermore, it is highly regressive, so that 
the burden of supporting education tends to fall heavily on 
low-income families. 
(3) Cost pressures, and particularly salary awards to 
teachers, are placing heavy strains on the existing fiscal 
structure, causing legislators, educators, and taxpayers to 
seriously consider alternatives. 
These forces are causing some states to consider seriously a 
shift in the support of education from the local district to the 
state. In Michigan, a gubernatorial task force recommended 
such a shift and Governor Milliken has expressed himself 
strongly in support of it. Such leading figures as James 
Conant and Commissioner of Education James Allen have 
taken similar positions. At the present Constitutional 
Convention in Illinois, proposals for state assumption of 
the responsibility for a high quality educational program for 
all chi!Ciren lead in the same direction .... 
These proposals do not suggest that non-fiscal decisions be 
centralized. Local school districts would continue to exist, 
but they would give their attention to educational rather than 
revenue matters. Hawaii's structure of educational gov-
ernance, a single school district for an entire state, is probably 
not appropriate for other states.a 
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations (ACIR), an appointed, bi-partisan inter-
governmental agency representing federal, state and 
local branches of government, has recently recom-
mended that the States assume "substantially all" of 
the responsibility for financing local schools in order 
to grant property tax relief and ensure equal edu-
cational opportunity. The recommendation envisions 
replacing property tax revenue with income and sales 
tax revenues. 
Local schools are claiming more and more of the property 
tax take. At the beginning of World War II about one-third 
of all local property tax revenue went to the public schools; 
now the school share is more than 50 percent-and still rising. 
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Other local public services, the Advisory Commission be-
lieves, should have a stronger claim on the local property 
tax base .... 
The p_roposal is not utopian. At present, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Delaware, and Louisiana for example are within 
striking distance of this goal. And Hawaii for many years 
has both paid for and administered all its public schools. 
What is involved is the substitution of State income and 
sales tax dollars for local property tax dollars. The change-
over could be gradual. However, as many as 20 States could 
assume complete responsibility for public school financing in 
the near future if they would make as intensive use of per-
sonal income and sales taxes as the "top ten" States now 
make on the average .... 
The case for State take over of the non-Federal share of 
education costs rests in part on the conviction that this is the 
best way to make sure that the financial resources under-
lying public education are equalized throughout the State. 
Because the social and economic consequences of education 
are felt far beyond school district boundaries, States no longer 
can tolerate wide differences in the quality of education 
offered in its many local districts. Yet so long as each district 
has wide latitude in setting its own tax levy, great variations 
both in wealth and willingness to tax are inevitable. And 
these variables produce wide differences in the fiscal resources 
behind the students. As a result the quality of education today 
is shaped in large measure by the accidents of local property 
tax geography.7 
The Commission thus views the concept of full state 
funding as not only desirable but feasible. 
Governor William G. Milliken of Michigan has been 
endeavoring to achieve broad reform in educational 
finance in that state for the last two years. In his 
"Special Message to the Legislature on Excellence in 
Education-Equity in Taxation" (April 12, 1971 ), he 
proposed the virtual elimination, by constitutional 
amendment, of the property tax for school operating 
purposes. In its place, he would substitute an increase 
in the individual income tax and a value-added tax 
on businesses. According to his estimates, a 2.3 % 
increase in the individual income tax would com-
pensate for the loss on individually held property. In 
place of a corporate income tax, which according to 
him would have to be set at too high a rate if it were to 
yield adequate revenue, he proposes a value-added 
tax of approximately 2 % . The substitution of these 
taxes for the property tax would probably assure that 
revenues for education would increase over time. 
The increased elasticity of the tax structure would 
probably eliminate the need for regular increases in 
education tax rates. 
The Milliken Plan would have important con-
sequences. It would remove the necessity for frequent 
school millage elections. It would replace the relatively 
inelastic property tax with taxes which are more 
responsive to economic growth. It would eliminate 
the situation wherein some school districts with low 
tax rates are able to provide adequate levels of 
education, while others, with high tax rates, are 
unable to generate sufficient revenue. It would replace 
a regressive tax with taxes which are proportional 
and progressive. 
More recently, it has been reported that the 
Fleischman Commission in New York State, which 
is examining the financing of that state's public schools, 
will be recommending full state assumption of the 
costs of education, imposition of a statewide property 
tax, stabilization of spending in wealthy school 
districts, and ultimately greater spending in districts 
with poor, disadvantaged youth. The concern for 
legislative reform of public school finance systems 
is fortunate because it is certainly envisioned that it 
is legislatures which will have to respond to possible 
court mandates. 
A Slight Digression on Local Control of Public 
Education 
The strongest objection to full state funding is the 
belief that it would result in a diminution of local 
control over schools. To be sure, the belief is most 
strongly voiced by those who wish to protect the 
economic advantage of taxpayers and students in the 
wealthier school districts. All that can be predicted 
with certainty at the moment is the loss of one element 
of local school control-the power of school districts 
to determine their level of expenditures. The projected 
loss of any other powers is purely speculative. 
The assumption that local financing is inextricably 
intertwined with local control was called into question 
by James B. Conant in a speech before the Education 
Commission of the States in 1968: 
I would point out, however, that in the years in which I 
have tried to convince people of the importance and the 
correctness of our system here in the United States, I always 
assumed that local control of schools was a necessary con-
sequence of local financing of the schools and vice versa. I 
think the New Brunswick example is a demonstration that this 
equation may well be wrong. It may well be that you can 
have local control of all the vital aspects of the public schools 
and still have the financing at the state level through state 
taxes and not through the local property tax. 
On the issue of local control the Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations has said: 
State assumption of school financing in the Commission's 
judgment is not inconsistent with effective local policy control. 
Ample room for local initiative and innovation would remain. 
Liberated from the necessity of 'selling' bond issues and 
tax rate increases, school board members and superintendents 
could concentrate on their main concern-improving the 
quality of their children's education. The long tradition of 
local control of educaton and the keen concern of parents 
for the educational well-being of their children would serve 
as sturdy defenses against any effort to short-change edu-
cational financial needs.s 
A former superintendent of schools in Maryland 
has said: 
For nearly 14 years I served as superintendent of schools 
for a county adjacent to the state of Delaware, and enjoyed 
a close working relationship with a number of my counterparts 
in that state. Delaware, at that time, provided up to 90% 
of the total cost of operating the local school systems, 
whereas Maryland provided from 30% to 40%. I can testify 
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that the local school systems of Delaware enjoyed at least 
as much, if not greater, autonomy than did those of 
Maryland. The reason for this, I suspect, would be found 
in the statutory powers given to state and local authorities 
in each case, and the roles assumed by the state authorities. 
I suspect that these factors have more to do with the presence 
of local control than the level of state funding. 9 
Congressman John Dow of New York, speaking 
in support of his proposed legislation to ease the local 
property tax burden for local educational costs, said: 
The principal objection I have heard to the plan contained 
in my school tax bill is the presumption that local school 
boards, if no longer responsible for raising school taxes, 
would lose local control of their educational systems, and that 
there would be a State takeover. To this criticism, I reply 
that in my own State of New York the State now provides 
45 per cent of the school support. With that much leverage 
the State could exert immense influence on local school 
decisions, even today; but it does not. Why? It does not for 
one reason, because the State legislature made up of local 
representatives would not allow it and, second, that is not 
the nature of our educational system. Nobody wants it 
that way.lo 
Congressman Dow makes an extremely important 
point. If states were inclined to assume control of local 
schools, they have had both the financial leverage 
and the legislative power for years. 
The only actual test of centralized financing and 
decentralized control has been in the Canadian 
Province of New Brunswick. The Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations, in its report 
on the New Brunswick experience, concluded that 
the provincial takeover of school finance "leaves room 
for local administration and local discretion rather 
than necessitating centralized decision-making on the 
Hawaii model." 11 New Brunswick is still in the process 
of establishing new relationships caused by the shift 
from local to provincial financing. Moreover, there are 
enough differences between the Canadian and 
American situations to prevent direct comparisons. 
For example, curriculum was and remains a provincial 
responsibility, although efforts are being made to 
decentralize it. Nonetheless, the New Brunswick 
experience suggests that substantial control can remain 
at the local level with centralized financing. 
The argument that centralized financing will lead 
to a loss of local control is a largely untested hy-
pothesis. At its worst, the argument is a smokescreen 
for opponents of equality of educational opportunity. 
At its best, the argument is an expression of concern 
for our public schools as we know them and wish 
to preserve them. We will not know the effect of full 
state funding on local decision-making until we 
implement it. In the meantime, the state is granting 
more of its educational resources to some children and 
withholding resources from others. 
None of the proponents of centralized financing 
advocate centralized control. All stress the importance 
of local control over crucial curriculum and personnel 
decisions. It is clear that the states have long had the 
wherewithal to usurp local prerogatives if they were so 
inclined. Yet the concept of local control is so strong 
in American public education that it is probably its 
own sturdiest defense. 
A Model Legislative Response12 
The specific plan outlined below was designed for 
the State of Maryland. Its principles seem consistent 
with the second interpretation of Serrano and not 
inconsistent with the first interpretation of Serrano 
discussed earlier. The principles may be feasible for 
many states, although the proposal, in its detail, is 
surely not applicable to other states without modifi-
cation. Major differences between Maryland and many 
other states are the fact that Maryland has only 
twenty-four school districts and the fact that ex-
penditure variations within the state are relatively 
moderate. In addition, Maryland has already taken 
a major step in the direction of equalization in having 
assumed responsibility for all construction costs. A 
state committee sets priorities based upon requests 
from school districts. Consequently, the recom-
mendations here deal only with current operating 
expenses. 
Our concept of full state funding calls for a school 
finance system which brings to bear all of a state's 
educational tax base on the education of all children 
in the public schools of that state. It provides for equity 
both in educational taxation and in educational 
resource allocation. It requires that educational 
resource allocation not depend upon where a student 
lives, what his parental circumstances are, or how 
highly his neighbors value education.13 It avoids the 
specious state/local distinction in the generation 
of educational revenues, for all taxes raised for ed-
ucation are in reality state taxes. 14 This concept 
clearly accommodates a variety of educational 
resource allocation schemes and systems for edu-
cational taxation. Its only essential characteristic is 
that there be equity in the benefits and burdens of 
education. The concept is compatible with the present 
system of local school control. A version of full state 
funding is explicated in the recommendations which 
follow. 
1. It is recommended that the state assume fi-
nancial responsibility for all public schools. 
2. It is recommended that, over a period of three 
years, per pupil expenditures from state and "local" 
funds be equalized among school districts in the state. 
The movement from the present mechanism of 
school finance to a full state funding mechanism cannot 
occur in a responsible manner in a single year. Sub-
stantial additions to revenues in poorer school districts 
cannot be judiciously accommodated at once. An 
increment of several hundred dollars per pupil in 
some school districts could not be planned for in an 
educationally and fiscally responsible manner. It is 
proposed that the new system be phased in over a 
period of three years. Thus a "freeze," with perhaps 
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some accommodation for a cost of living increase, 
would immediately be placed on the highest-spending 
school district until the lowest-spending districts reach 
the level of the highest. 
The effects on decision-making in the lower-
spending districts would obviously be dramatic. The 
availability of substantial new revenues will lead to 
increases in educational quality only with careful 
planning and analysis. Those responsible for planning 
in the poorer districts will, for the first time, have the 
means to emulate the desirable characteristics of 
the more affluent schools and school districts. The 
onus on the planners will be heavy. The easiest step 
would be merely to increase the number of teachers. 
The real task for the planners i's to evaluate the 
efficacy of alternative educational arrangements. 
Indeed, in the poorer school districts, the ability to 
determine goals and means locally will be substantially 
enhanced. The lack of available revenues will no 
longer be an excuse for failure to act on educational 
problems. Also, the importance of improved decision-
making by wealthier school districts will be heightened. 
Wealthier school districts will be in a position of 
having to evaluate their alternatives more carefully. 
There will be no diminution of local responsibility for 
educational decision-making. 
Phasing in a system of equalized expenditures per 
pupil will obviously require new revenues. 15 A three-
year period will permit a gradual assumption by the 
state of this responsibility. 
3. It is recommended that the equalized level of 
per pupil expenditures in three years be set at the 
level of the highest-spending school district in 
1971-72. The highest spending school district has in 
one sense defined for the state a conception of high 
quality education, at least insofar as inputs are con-
cerned. Moreover, to equalize expenditures per pupil 
at any but the level of the highest would mean 
interfering with the programs currently in operation 
in the high spending school districts. 
Of course, there will be some revenue-cost squeeze 
on the high spending school districts. These districts 
may have to make some difficult trade-off decisions. 
For example, they may not be able to accede to 
teachers' demands for salary increases without cutting 
back on other services or without hiring fewer new 
teachers. Each district will have the responsibility for 
deciding how to allocate its revenue between salary 
and non-salary expenses. 
4. It is recommended that, in order to allow for 
regional price-level differences, the per pupil expen-
diture in any school district may vary five per cent 
in either direction from the state-equalized level. It is 
undoubtedly the case that regional price-level differ-
ences affect the cost of education. However, assessing 
the impact of such differences is difficult and the 
issue becomes intertwined with the question, of 
quality. For example, housing and perhaps other 
goods and services for teachers are less expensive in 
rural areas. Consequently, it may be possible to pay 
somewhat lower salaries in rural areas. On the other 
hand, if rural salaries are much lower than average, 
rural districts may have difficulty in recruiting high 
quality teachers. Indeed, it is possible to argue that 
salaries in rural districts should be higher so that 
teaching in such districts may be perceived as more 
desirable. Because the question of regional price-level 
differences is so fraught with intangibles, it is proposed 
that a five per cent variation be allowed in per pupil 
expenditures in any school district. It is assumed that 
the higher expenditures will be found in urbanized 
areas and the lower in rural areas. 
5. In addition, it is recommended that, in order 
to allow for differences in economies of scale, the per 
pupil expenditure in any school may vary five per cent 
in either direction from the district-equalized level. 
It is almost certainly the case in education, as in other 
areas, that the principle of economies of scale 
operates. In other words, it is probably the case that 
a reduction in cost per student occurs as school size 
increases, up to a limit at least.16 Studies of the 
economies of scale in schools has not resulted in 
definitive knowledge about how extensively the 
principle operates. As a starting point, we recommend 
that in any school per pupil expenditures may vary 
five per cent in either direction from the equalized 
level. It is assumed that per pupil expenditures will 
be higher in smaller schools and lower in larger 
schools. As more definitive knowledge becomes 
available, the five per cent rule should be modified 
accordingly. 
A second reason for this recommendation is to 
require a school-by-school audit of funds in order to 
ensure that the effect of statewide equalization is not 
lost through misallocations within school districts. 
Both the five per cent difference for economies of 
scale and the five per cent difference for regional 
price-levels are designed to allow for some play in the 
system. For the most part, the economies of scale 
factor will operate in favor of small schools in rural 
areas while the price-level factor will operate in favor 
of school districts in metropolitan areas. However, it 
is conceivable that occasionally a small school in an 
urban setting will be operating at a level ten per cent 
above the equalized level. 
6. It is recommended that certain types of federal 
aid, notably Title I (assistance for educationally 
deprived children) of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA), be allocated in addition to 
the equalized level of per pupil expenditure. The 
recommendation to grant federal compensatory aid 
to eJucationally deprived children in an equalized 
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state system is a natural evolution of the present 
system and is in recognition of the special needs of 
such children. In fact, the federal government is now 
requiring "comparability of services" within a school 
district, before Title I, ESEA funds can be awarded, 
although enforcement of this requirement to date has 
been spotty. Under this requirement, no federal Title I 
funds are to be awarded to a local school district 
otherwise entitled to such funds unless that district 
allocates all funds it receives from local and state 
sources in an equitable manner among the individual 
schools in the district. The reasoning is simple: federal 
funds can hardly be compensatory and supplementary 
until school districts are providing at least com-
parable services to schools which receive them. 
Under the proposed plan, the responsibility for 
comparability of services would be transferred from 
the local to the state level and comparability would 
seem to be satisfied by a state's provision of equal 
per pupil expenditures. The effectiveness of Title I 
projects should be enhanced, since educationally 
deprived children will already be receiving the 
benefits now enjoyed by children in affluent school 
districts. 
7. It is recommended that certain types of federal 
aid, notably school assistance in federally impacted 
areas, not be allocated in addition to the equalized 
level of per pupil expenditure. Certain types of federal 
aid are given merely to subsidize costs. "Impacted 
area" aid is currently the most important of this type. 
It is given to school districts which have experienced 
an influx of students because of a federal activity. 
It was established on the assumption, probably shaky, 
that federal employees would not be contributing 
their fair share of school costs through taxes. Unlike 
Title I of ESEA, it is not given in recognition of the 
special needs of the children of federal employees. 
Under the present mechanism for allocating impact 
aid, the state should reduce its share of support in 
exactly the amount that a school district receives 
such aid. 
8. It is recommended that a uniform statewide 
tax on property or a mandated uniform locally-
imposed tax on property be instituted, for the purpose 
of financing education. It is further recommended 
that additional revenues for education be generated 
by other statewide taxes, preferably the income tax. 
There are two broad approaches which will achieve 
equalization of per pupil expenditures. Both will have 
the same effect with respect to equalizing educational 
tax rates and per pupil expenditures, but involve 
the use of different mechanisms to gain that e.ffect. 
The first is full equalization, in which locally-raised 
funds predominate and through which the same local 
tax effort for education in every school district of 
the state, combined with state financial assistance, 
will yield the same number of dollars per pupil. The 
second, full state funding, is a system under which 
the state assumes responsibility for raising a sub-
stantial portion of the funds for education at the state 
level and adopts policies which ensure that funds 
from all state and local sources will yield the same 
number of dollars per pupil. 
Both of these approaches can have as their object 
the equalization of per pupil expenditures. Both 
envision that all tax rates for educational purposes 
are uniform throughout the state. Their difference is 
one of degree, not kind, and in its most important 
dimension the difference is psychological. Under 
both systems a given taxpayer will pay the same taxes 
for the support of education. Under the first approach, 
a larger portion of the education bill will be financed 
from locally-generated taxes; under the second, these 
same locally-generated taxes will initially flow to the 
state through a mechanism such as a state income 
tax or state property tax, thence to be reallocated to 
local school districts. 
The full equalization approach appears to be a 
less dramatic change from our present system and, 
say some, is less likely to affect the sense of local 
control. On the other hand, when legislatures begin 
to act on equalization formulas to supplement locally-
based taxes, they inevitably "tinker" with these 
formulas and the result is always decreased equaliza-
tion. 
A bolder approach is to opt for full state funding, 
placing the responsibility for educational finance 
squarely with the legislature. Perhaps this approach 
will be less subject to tinkering by the legislature. It 
certainly is more forthright and recognizes that all 
school taxes are in reality state taxes. 
It is estimated that full state funding would increase 
the cost of education in Maryland by $200 million 
by 197 4-7 5. In other words, Maryland would require 
approximately an additional $66 million per 
year each year beginning in 19 72-7 3. The cost of 
education in 1972-73, the first year of the proposed 
phase-in, is estimated to be $725 million. 
The following table projects the per pupil ex-
penditure, the total cost and enrollment for each of 
the three years in question.11 The expenditure 
estimates are based upon an extrapolation of 
1969-70 rates (the latest year for which data were 
available when the study was done) and do not account 
for inflation. 
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There are alternative ways of generating this 
revenue. In 1971-72, it is estimated that state and 
federal aid will already be providing $ 312 million, 
leaving an additional $413 million to be provided 
from what were formerly locally-raised tax monies. 
A statewide unifonn property tax of $2.00 per $100 
of assessed valuation to replace the local property 
tax for education would yield $420 million, more 
than enough revenue to finance the first year of the 
proposed plan. At the present time, all school districts, 
save five, have local appropriations for education 
equivalent to levies in excess of $2.00 per $100. 
A $2.00 tax rate would take care of the first year 
of the plan; subsequently, however, additional 
revenues will have to be realized through other tax 
sources. Adjustments in the state sales tax to employ 
features used in other states would yield from an 
additional $33 million to an additional $82 million. 
Adapting the state income tax to the Oregon model 
(rates from four to ten per cent and an exemption 
of $600 per person) would yield an additional $54 
million. 1 s 
This treatment of alternative tax sources is not 
meant to be definitive. Rather, it is meant merely to 
illustrate that the proposed full state funding plan is 
feasible in Maryland. On general tax burden for 
education, Maryland currently ranks in the middle of 
the states. With an expenditure of $50. 73 per $1,000 
of personal income, Maryland is just above the 
national average of $46.88, but below twenty-two 
other states.19 In Maryland, there appears to be some 
leeway to increase school revenues. 
9. Assuming the institution of these recom-
mendations in 1972-73, the state will have achieved 
an equalized level of per pupil expenditure by 
1974-75. At that point, the state legislature can 
begin to set levels for educational spending in com-
petition with its assessment of needs for other public 
services. This recommendation recognizes that 
education is only one of a number of public services 
competing for a share of governmental revenue. 
From a statewide perspective, the legislature will be 
in a better position to assess these competing 
demands. 
Summary 
These recommendations taken as an interrelated 
set will result in a full state funding system of financing 
public education. There will be an equitable distribu-
tion of the educational tax burden. The quality of a 
child's education will not be a function of the wealth 
of his parents, neighbors, or school district. The state 
will be spending as much money on the education 
of all of its children as it had previously been spending 
on the education of its rich children. Having achieved 
equity in the distribution of the state's resources, 
the distribution of such federal funds as Title I, 
ESEA, will become truly compensatory; the model 
thus recognizes the special problems of educating 
some children. 
As was stated at the outset, what Serrano mandates 
is not clear. The model proposed satisfies both 
interpretations of Serrano advanced above. The model 
satisfies the interpretation that the capacity of school 
districts to raise funds be equalized; it also satisfies 
the interpretation that all educational funds be made 
available to students on an equitable basis. If only 
the first interpretation is correct, then the model goes 
further than the California Supreme Court intended. 
If the Court did not intend the second interpretation 
then the opinion is concerned only with taxpayer 
equity and not equality of educational opportunity. 
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